It is US foreign policy which has created the present problem with Iran, ever since 1953 (as previously stated on this thread).
I'm copy-pasting this article from World Politics Review, think it has a quite a few good points. Hopefully, the US, Iran and Israel will all realise that they would all loose if they attacked each other. It really is Ahmadinejads rhetoric (and its similarities with Hitlers') that has put the West on alert but if its true that it was just an incorrect translation then hopefully someone with an influential position will point out that.
As for the Hiroshima/Nagasaki bombings, why couldn't the US simply drop the bombs on uninhabited Japanese territory or at least their military bases instead of dropping them over civilians?
The New Rules: How to Stop Worrying and Live with the Iranian Bomb
By Thomas P.M. Barnett | 14 Nov 2011
Column
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest report on Iran’s nuclear program surprised no one, even as it created the usual flurry of op-eds championing preventative “next steps.” As I’ve been saying for the past half-decade, there are none. Once the U.S. went into both Iraq and Afghanistan, the question went from being, “How do we prevent Iran from getting the Bomb?” to “How do we handle Iran’s Bomb?” That shift represents neither defeatism nor appeasement. Rather, it reflects a realistic analysis of America’s strategic options. With that in mind, here are 20 reasons why Iran’s successful pursuit of the Bomb is not the system-changing event so many analysts are keen to portray.
1. Iran’s efforts are not irrational. America invaded Iran’s western and eastern neighbors in quick succession, while putting Iran on notice that it, too, was on the list of George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil.” Decades of history tell Tehran: Get the Bomb, and the U.S. will never invade. Iran’s logic here is unassailable.
2. The world’s rising powers are not on board with the West. Brazil and Turkey made their diplomatic play last spring, and the West vilified them in response. Russia has already dismissed more sanctions as a clear “instrument of regime change.” China and India, along with Russia, have their own energy interests in Iran. In sum, Tehran’s workaround options are considerable.
3. More Western sanctions will have no impact. See above. Also, though the economic costs to date have been substantial, Tehran is willing to endure any amount of economic pain to ensure regime survival. The Arab Spring and the dangers it poses to the mullahs’ rule only sharpen this instinct.
4. Iran will not accept any deal that doesn’t include maintaining at least the pathway to the Bomb. The Bomb not only ensures regime survival, it is Tehran’s ticket to the great powers’ club. Without it, Iran is simply a failed revolution, a moribund economy and a sullen, checked-out society. With it, Iran is a focus of global attention and remains in the race for regional leadership.
5. Iran’s Bomb will offer the regime no significant new regional influence. Iran is already losing the Arab Spring -- and Iraq -- to Turkey and will likely lose influence to a revived Cairo as well. Iran’s Bomb is a desperate pan-Islamism card vis-à-vis Israel that will only engender a vigorous anti-Shiite response from the Saudis.
6. The strategic balance of power in the region will not dissolve. Iran’s Bomb means closing the door on a U.S. invasion, but nothing else. Iran’s limited proxy wars are neither enhanced nor inhibited by possessing the Bomb, as America will stand by both Israel and the Saudis.
7. America’s regional military presence will not be threatened. The U.S. military has a long and well-established record of serving as a tripwire presence in regional hotspots. That won’t change with Iran’s Bomb. If anything, Tehran’s achievement will reverse America’s growing fixation on building up its military in Asia vis-à-vis China.
8. The terror threat is overblown. Persian Iran isn’t pursuing the Bomb to put it in the hands of extremist Arab nonstate actors. Even Israel is a red herring for the Bomb’s ultimate purposes, which are clearly anti-U.S. and anti-Saudi.
9. The right historical analogy is not late-1930s Europe, but South Asia once both Pakistan and India got their Bomb. Israel is no Czechoslovakia. Rather, it is armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons and can wipe Iran off the map far more feasibly than vice versa. Yes, the early stages of a mutually assured destruction dyad between Israel and Iran would be scary, but the world has managed this scenario before -- with a perfect record to date.
10. The MAD situation between Israel and Iran is manageable. Israel owns a state-of-the-art multilayered missile defense system, which means it can survive a direct exchange far better than Iran ever could. It also means Israel could retaliate with confidence in any suitcase bomb scenario.
11. An Israeli attack will not work. It will slow down Iran’s pursuit of the Bomb, but as the -- presumably -- joint Israeli-U.S. Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran showed, Tehran can simply respond by ramping up its effort all the more.
12. A U.S. attack is not feasible any time soon. President Barack Obama doesn’t want to be a one-term president that badly, nor is he willing to tarnish his Nobel Peace Prize that decisively. More importantly, attacking Iran would torpedo Obama’s entire effort to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan with some sense of honor.
13. Iran has already achieved a crude but effective asymmetrical deterrence capability. There is no derailing the Bomb pursuit without regime change, and the U.S. is simply unwilling to take on that massive effort. The quick-and-dirty route is to nuke Iran’s facilities, sending the double signal of “No nukes for you!” and “See what we’re capable of?” But once you start talking about using nukes to destroy nukes, you realize that Iran has already achieved a sloppy deterrence.
14. A pre-emptive war works primarily to Iran’s advantage. The political infighting in Tehran is at an all-time high. Meanwhile, the Arab Spring is going badly for Iran. Thus an attack by either Israel or the U.S. would be a godsend to the decaying theocratic regime, changing those narratives and unifying the country.
15. We can easily arm Iran’s rivals. America has been selling arms like crazy throughout the region for a while now, and nothing will keep Washington from further enhancing the defensive -- and offensive -- capabilities of Iran’s many enemies.
16. The danger of wider proliferation is overblown. Yes, Riyadh and possibly Ankara will follow suit, but arguing that anti-Western regimes the world over will now seek a nuclear deterrent is fanciful. After all these years of freaking out about nuclear proliferation, we’re still talking about just the two remaining “Axis of Evil” members. To date, North Korea’s achievement has triggered no such regional nuclear race in East Asia. Iran’s effort likely will in the Middle East, but that is still a unique dynamic with limited legs.
17. The follow-on regional proliferation can be played to our advantage. Nothing clarifies the strategic mind like nukes. Once the Saudis join in, the world’s great powers will force a regional strategic dialogue. When that happens, Israel’s diplomatic existence will finally be recognized across the region.
18. The soft-kill option has worked before. In 1972, America gave the Soviets a signed piece of paper that declared them a legitimate nuclear power. Deprived of its own version of the “great Satan,” the USSR collapsed from within -- in the space of a generation. The Iranian mullahs’ self-destruction will come far faster.
19. We’ve got better fish to fry right now regionally. All focus should be on toppling Iran’s prime regional proxy, Syria, and bolstering the nascent governments in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya.
20. The global economy is more important. No one can afford $200-a-barrel oil.
Alarmist pundits -- and GOP candidates -- who still feel like turning Iran’s Bomb into America’s latest diplomatic obsession would do well to recall the 2008 U.S. presidential election: Obama was elected in large part to avoid such reckless calculations.