Twitter is a public forum; Ms. Guthrie compared it to a public square. You can communicate privately on it, and people do, but it is difficult. If you simply tweet, anyone who follows you can read it and anyone who doesn’t follow you can read it on the internet so long as they have a twitter account and yours is not private. If you address the tweet to someone by putting their handle first in the tweet, not only they will see it but those who follow their feed can see it as a tweet that they receive. If you mention someone’s handle in the text, then they will be notified even if the tweet is to someone else.
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Twitter is a powerful medium and gives an individual the potential to communicate with many people as if that individual had access to the mass media. As such, the individual has certain responsibilities, and must act within the law, as Mr. Elliott is charged with failing to do. However, the individual also enjoys a constitutional right to freedom of expression.
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Twitter not only expands access to readers to those who do not have access to the mass media, it is an alternative to the mass media. It has the potential to develop so that more and different points of view can be promoted, including those that are not reflected in traditional media. Since tweets can include links, I can conclude, just from the evidence, that Twitter can spread well-considered articles as well as the tweeter’s opinion. Any limitation on its use that is not necessary to prevent criminality will limit this potential. It will not be consistent with the freedom of expression that is essential to a free and democratic society.
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The essence of Twitter and hashtags, as the limited evidence in this case demonstrates, is to facilitate communication between people with like interests who voluntarily choose to follow certain topics or people and see what is being said about and by them. If you can’t use hashtags – whatever hashtags you want and no matter who created them – then you can’t use the platform to its potential.
Even with respect to tweeting in general, using Twitter while being protected from seeing another person’s tweets or having them see and comment on yours is unworkable. You can limit seeing another person’s tweets by blocking them, by not opening another person’s feed and by asking your friends not to retweet tweets from people you have blocked. And you can avoid reading their replies by not writing to them. But if you tweet with hashtags and follow hashtags, you are going to see every tweet that contains those hashtags, and anyone who wants can follow them. A blocker can choose to avoid seeing tweets with hashtags they follow from someone they have blocked, but they lose the benefit of the hashtag discussion by that choice.
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And I do not accept that blocking someone or telling them that you blocked them a month ago communicates that you are harassed. Ms. Guthrie was not harassed on July 7, yet she blocked him. There can be many reasons for not wanting to read someone’s tweets. In this case, as I will discuss, it was in part because Ms. Guthrie thought what Mr. Elliott had to say was worthless nonsense. This may be understandable, but is not equivalent to advising someone that you are harassed.
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Ms. Guthrie asked in testimony, “What did it matter that he had a valid point? Who cares?” I interpret this evidence, with the help of her explanation, as meaning that even if he had a valid point it did not permit him to stalk and harass her. In that sense, she is correct: you are not permitted to repeatedly communicate a valid point to someone when you know that they are harassed if it would cause them to reasonably fear for their safety in all of the circumstances.
But in another sense, important to the determination of this charge, Ms. Guthrie is not correct. If he had a valid point, he was entitled to use the hashtags that she had created and mention her, as he would not know that she was harassed by his expressing views in opposition to hers or her friends’. This is particularly the case regarding any issue about which Ms. Guthrie had herself engaged.
It goes further. He did not have to have a valid opinion in her view or even an opinion that was not spurious in her view. He could, in the tradition of Canadian freedom of expression that I discussed above, have a controversial or even offensive opinion. He could use extreme, hyperbolic, provocative language such as “fascist feminists.” He could be, and unfortunately was, homophobic and insulting.
Mr. Elliott’s view, as emerges from the content of his proven tweets, is that he could write what he wanted. His view conforms to the Twitter rules and the Canadian value of freedom of expression. If that was his state of mind, then he would not know that Ms. Guthrie was harassed by his doing what was lawful and what the platform they were both using permitted. What was lawful remained lawful; it does not amount to a crime unless the person communicating knows that the other person is harassed.
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The proper use of Twitter is complicated, as it is developing. One view is Mr. Elliott’s as expressed in tweets such as, “You don’t know the value of twitter. If you want a private conversation use email,” and tweets expressing the importance of allowing others to tweet even if you think their opinions have no validity and are garbage. Ms. Guthrie’s view is the opposite. Though she testified that Mr. Elliott had a right to give his opinion, she took the position that she could demand that she be excluded from receiving it, which is her right – but also that he had to comply and cooperate, which is not her right.
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Each aspect of his tweeting is legitimate. To repeat, tweeting on a topic and exercising freedom of expression, arguing facts about his history with Ms. Guthrie (possibly falsely regarding his having no sexual interest), exercising and expressing his opinion on the proper use of the medium that everyone was using, is permitted.
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To argue this tweet as a sample of criminal harassment does not advance the proposition that Mr. Elliott knew Ms. Guthrie was harassed; it raises doubt as to whether he knew or not. It comes back to the two understandably different ways that Mr. Elliott and Ms. Guthrie viewed the whole affair.
His volume of tweets harassed her because of her view that she could control people’s non-threatening, non-sexual use of her handle and hashtags that she used beyond not reading their tweets and taking the ineffectual step of blocking. He cannot be imputed with knowledge that Ms. Guthrie was harassed by his tweeting. Mr. Elliott was not responsible for that view, which is at least arguably incompatible with Twitter.
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It is reasonable that fear can arise just from the fact of someone continuing to contact someone after being asked to stop. That behaviour could reasonably signify that the person who continued the contact was capable of anything since they ignored the request. Findings of reasonable fear are made on just that basis; I have done so myself in criminal harassment trials.
But in this case, Ms. Guthrie’s unreasonable premise that Mr. Elliott was irrational and had nothing valid to say meant that she never put his tweets into any context. The very fact of his tweeting any hashtag she followed or any tweet about her or with her handle harassed her.
She would not even allow for the possibility that he had any reason apart from the obsession with her that he perceived to tweet about her. Given that she had a leadership role in the campaign to denounce him, that is not reasonable.
I do not restrict this consideration to physical safety, as s. 264 can include psychological safety. Though Crown counsel argued that as a basis of Ms. Guthrie’s fear, I did not interpret her fear of danger to mean that. She particularly cited his knowing the neighbourhood in which she lived, and there is no evidence that she feared for her psychological safety. But that fear must also be reasonable.