Russia's new electronic warfare device has a range of 5,000km - heads up to Rocha in Porto, his TV reception might get a bit fuzzy if things escalate
I take it for the cause)))
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Russia's new electronic warfare device has a range of 5,000km - heads up to Rocha in Porto, his TV reception might get a bit fuzzy if things escalate
The first combat footage of Russian BMPT 'Terminators' is starting to appear online. I would not want to be facing these.
The M1 has in fact consistently failed five of its six Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Durability (RAM-D) requirements, according to the last operational test, and actual use data collected in 1988 (See Chart B and C)....
On the contrary, Army actual use figures show that the turbine-powered M1 requires unscheduled maintenance over five times as often as the diesel M60 tank.2 Furthermore, the M1 and M1A1 tanks cost three to four times as much to maintain as does the diesel-engined M60.3 (See Chart C)
One should take note of the low maintenance figures in Chart B. Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Durability (RAM-D) requirements. These seem to meet or nearly meet the RAM-D requirements. However, if one goes to Chart C, "Actual Use Data," one can see that this low level of maintenance has a serious effect on the number of tanks available for use. In other words, the less time (maintenance hours) you spend maintaining your tanks, the less tanks there are to use on any given day.
Reference the last two columns in Chart C. As long as the numbers in the MH/H (maintenance hours per operating hours) figures are high, so are the availiability (Avlb) figures. When the MH/H figures go down to 1.0 for the M1 and .7 for the M1A1 in the 3/88 period, only 81% of the M1's and 79% of the M1A1's are available. A high rate of availability (95% is the Army's frequent claim) is implicit in the maintenance ratio (MH/H) figure. Therefore, these low maintenance ratio figures should not be used when evaluating the M1's reliability and maintainability.
The turbine engine also manifests its delicate nature by requiring extra care when operating in less than ideal conditions. The M1's operator's manual specifically warns that falling leaves and/or snow can be sucked into the air intake during normal operations. Both can require organizational maintenance. And if the tank crew attempts to clear snow and ice from the intake system, they may damage it.4...
The amount of fuel consumption in an armored division is of paramount importance. The Army's field manual FM 100-5 observes:
"Today, it is estimated that one armored division equipped with M1 tanks will consume over 600,000 gallons of fuel per day, more than twice the consumption of Patton's entire army." (and they ran out of gas!) (p. 60, chapter 4) (an M1 armored division has 348 tanks)
The Army has often contended that the bottom line in fuel consumption is the tank's capability of operating for a whole day without refueling. While this is important, it is also vital that sufficient fuel be available to accomodate daily refueling. As stated earlier, an M1 division is expected to consume roughly 600,000 gallons of fuel per day. To get this to the front requires a large supply train. And a tank battalion can only move as fast as its supply moves.
As a result of the M1's lack of fuel efficiency, the Army has had to increase the number of trucks that follow it. As of 1981, the army had to add the following equipment to each M1 tank battalion:
6 five-ton trucks
6 tank pump units
1 semi-tractor with 5,000 gallon fuel trailer
6 tank pump units
6 1.5 ton cargo trailers
With the introduction of the M1A1, the fuel situation has worsened. The Army has had to add another four 10-ton, 2,500 gallon fuel carriers, according to Maj. Mazzia of the Army's Ft. Knox Armor School. This totals 128 support vehicles assigned to each battalion of 58 M1A1 tanks. While the M1 may be able to move quickly across terrain, it must always wait for these vehicles to catch up....
The M1's power to weight ratio and agility are matched by the M1's more fuel efficient diesel contemporaries (23.9 horsepower/ton for the M1A1 vs. 24.7 horsepower/ton for the Leopard II. See Chart A) And while the M1 has a very powerful engine, and an advanced suspension, it is handicapped by its track (tread) system. The M1 is the only series of tanks in the world that has permanently bonded (non-removable) rubber track pads. While this saves over a ton in weight, it makes the M1 very difficult to maneuver in mud, snow or ice, according to Army test results.6 On most other tanks, including the German Leopard II, the rubber pads are removable. This allows snow grousers to be substituted for greater traction. In addition, it means that the rubber pads can be replaced when they wear out. When the M1's pads wear out, the entire track shoe (section of track) must be replaced. In every M1 Quarterly Operation and Support Cost Study Report reviewed by the Project, more money was spent on track shoe assemblies than on any other part. (See appendices B and C)
In addition, the M1's suspension and track system suffers from a propensity for throwing the track off the tank. In particular, the armor that covers the top of the track system has a habit of trapping mud, snow and sand around the drive sprocket (the wheel which actually moves the track), which causes it to throw the track off the tank. Despite the Army's insistence that this problem has been solved, it was recently cited in a British Army review of the M1 tank.7 That article cites:
American Abrams tanks vulnerable even to Soviet-era weapons, says expertPoor suspension when compared to the excellent system on the Challenger (British main battle tank)
Short track life
Rear skirting plate allows mud to build up around sprocket, thus encouraging a thrown track
Again, while the M1 has very advanced armor protection, and a low profile, so do other modern tanks. The M1 is unique, however, in suffering from an enormous heat signature. The heat signature (ability of the tank to be seen with infrared devices) of the M1 comes from the hot exhaust of its turbine engine. While the Soviets have reduced their tanks' thermal signature by roughly 24% in recent models8, we have increased our heat signatures dramatically by adopting the turbine engine for the M1. The M1's exhaust is so hot that it can burn the paint off a car should it follow the tank too closely. The operator's manual repeatedly warns that the exhaust if "very hot and can burn personnel."9 This means that the M1 is not only easily spotted, but is also positively identifiable at extremely long ranges with inrfared equipment - being the only tank in the world with such a heat signature.
Abrams tanks repeatedly demonstrated their vulnerability during the hostilities in Iraq, the expert pointed out. "As the Iraq combat experience shows, they went up in flames. The tank turret was pierced by a 100mm armor-piercing blunt nose projectile fired by a T-55 tank. There were instances when Abrams vehicles were struck by automatic guns of both Bradley and our BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles," he said.
Instances are also known when the American tank was destroyed by the first Soviet modifications of T-72 tanks firing old shells "that were withdrawn from operational use even before the Abrams concept was devised," Suvorov said.
The expert also pointed to the instances when Abrams tanks were wiped out by RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchers.
An extra powerplant installed in the rear part of the turret to power modern electronic systems is another weak point of later American tank modifications, the expert said. "It was covered with the armor that can withstand assault rifle bullets but is vulnerable to a 12.7 mm DShK machine gun. It was hit by a DShK and its motor was smashed, oil and fuel went ablaze and spilled down to the main engine located below. The main engine went ablaze and then the tank itself went up in flames and burnt out," he said.
The American tank almost has no chances, if it engages in a duel with Russian tanks, the expert said.
"If an Abrams emerges at a long distance, a T-72 or a T-90 crew will fire an anti-tank missile and we can say that the Abrams will even have no chance to fire a shot as its range of fire won’t allow it to do that," he explained.
However, the US tank’s final efficiency depends on the commander’s skills to operate it and trained crews, the expert said.
Structural and operational flaws
Apart from the need to fill Abrams tanks with clean jet fuel, they also have more serious operational flaws. In particular, they cannot be repaired in field conditions, the expert said.
"Repairs are a major problem. If something breaks down in the powerplant, it has to be pulled out of the tank, taken to a special repair workshop with skilled personnel, disconnected from the gear box and only then repaired," Suvorov said.
The air intake system of US-made Abrams tanks is yet another vulnerability, the expert pointed out. "They feature an air filter that operates similar to the equipment installed in motor vehicles: if it becomes clogged, it has to be taken out and cleaned. Meanwhile, all of our tanks are equipped with cyclone dust collectors that are quite smart devices," the expert said, adding that an Abrams filter sufficed for just 15 minutes of the tank’s movement along dusty terrain during the Iraq campaign.
This may be a major hurdle in employing Abrams tanks in the zone of the special military operation in Ukraine, the expert warned. "It is still possible to operate in winter but summer in Ukraine is quite dusty," he said.
The Abrams rate of fire falls after the first three or four shots due to its separate loading system. Secondly, its principle in the American vehicle is inferior to that in other Western tanks and will further cut the crew’s efficiency, the expert pointed out.
"In a Leopard tank, a loader stands straight whereas the Abrams designers sought to reduce the tank’s height and a loader inside the vehicle operates bent low, which is not quite comfortable," he explained.
The weapons were too complex for Ukrainian forces to train on quickly — and too difficult to keep running once they started trudging through the country’s muddy winter terrain, they argued.
“The Abrams tank is a very complicated piece of equipment. It’s expensive, it’s hard to train on. It has a jet engine, I think it’s about three gallons to the mile of jet fuel. It is not the easiest system to maintain,” said Colin Kahl, the Pentagon’s top policy official, after a trip to Kyiv earlier this month. “It may or may not be the right system.”
Kahl’s and others’ comments also frustrated defense industry executives who felt the Pentagon was making disparaging remarks about U.S.-manufactured equipment. Weeks before, Laura Cooper, a Pentagon official charged with overseeing Ukraine policy, called the Abrams a “gas guzzler.”
The first combat footage of Russian BMPT 'Terminators' is starting to appear online. I would not want to be facing these.
That whole M1 Abrams gas turbine boondoggle looks like a clear-cut case of someone in the government military procurement management being given a few donuts to buy pointless, overly sophisticated, massively expensive systems for the army so that some random board members or lobbyists of the military-industrial complex can buy new Lamborghinis.
Putting a delicate jet engine onto a tank crawling through dust and debris, all to achieve some extra speed, in an environment where tanks aren't supposed to rush out beyond their friendly support forces anyway? Who thought that was a good idea?
It's not a "jet engine". It uses jet fuel because it's a turbine engine.
In practice the engine performs extremely well. Vastly better than the diesel engine used on other heavy vehicles such as the USA's mobile artillery platforms and APCs.. The catch is that maintenance is a nightmare and like all tanks the fuel efficiency is measured in gallons per mile.
The way the American MIC is set up, there is a strong incentive for companies to produce high-maintenance weapons that will come with a big service, maintenance and replacement parts pricetag. That`s the reason why most of these army weapons like the M777 or the A1M1 are so complicated. You see this, to a smaller extent, in the auto market, where cars have become a whole lot more complex and require more elaborate maintenance at the dealership.
Also a big problem in the agriculture machinery sector, with newer John Deere tractors being nightmares to maintain, vs the sturdy older models tthat farmers coulld tinker with and keep up themselves, or at the local shop.
Up to now, the US has had no problem setting up support, repair and logistics for these weapons systems as they have been operating in weak mideastern countries that were conquered relatively easily. The Ukraine campaign is a whole different can of worms, it is exposing that aspect of endemic MIC corruption, bigtime...
Just one point of order here, and not to dog pile.... There is not a significant US .mil supply chain presence in Ukraine in the same capacity there would be in a mobilization of US troops. Yes there is logistical support from NATO countries, yes we are sending contractors and FSR's to do training and SOME depot level maintenance....but nothing like what we are talking about with the mobilization of US Army/Marine Logistics elements, and all the assets which are carried in the formation of those depots, coupled with the force protection posture which accompanies it.The way the American MIC is set up, there is a strong incentive for companies to produce high-maintenance weapons that will come with a big service, maintenance and replacement parts pricetag. That`s the reason why most of these army weapons like the M777 or the A1M1 are so complicated. You see this, to a smaller extent, in the auto market, where cars have become a whole lot more complex and require more elaborate maintenance at the dealership.
Also a big problem in the agriculture machinery sector, with newer John Deere tractors being nightmares to maintain, vs the sturdy older models tthat farmers coulld tinker with and keep up themselves, or at the local shop.
Up to now, the US has had no problem setting up support, repair and logistics for these weapons systems as they have been operating in weak mideastern countries that were conquered relatively easily. The Ukraine campaign is a whole different can of worms, it is exposing that aspect of endemic MIC corruption, bigtime...
How it started:
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How it's going:
The first combat footage of Russian BMPT 'Terminators' is starting to appear online. I would not want to be facing these.